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Introduction
In a seminal paper, Aghion et al. (2005) collect a robust empirical evidence about the relationship between product market concentration and the intensity of innovative activity. They show that such relationship follows an inverted-U shape pattern with respect to market concentration as measured by an appropriately de…ned Lerner index. They then go on to rationalize such curve by means of a model in which technologically asymmetric …rms strive for improving their cost gap in R&D races under uncertainty. Innovation occur step-by-step and the e¤ect of market competition on R&D investment results from the balance between what they call the "Schumpeterian"e¤ect and the "escaping competition"incentive. Aghion et al. (2005) have then revitalized the old debate about the relationship between market structure and innovation. Such debate (see Reinganum, 1989 , for an excellent survey) was mostly focussed on a binary menu contrasting the arguments behind Schumpeter (1942) well-known alleged superiority of monopoly in driving innovative activity and the opposite conclusion by Arrow (1962) . By showing that the relationship may exhibit an inverted-U shape, they provide an important empirical contribution; moreover, their model o¤ers a theoretical frame accomodating such pattern. 1 In this paper we show that another, arguably simpler model of product market competition and innovation may predict an inverted-U shape curve. 1 On the inverted-U shape relationship, see the empirical evidence collected by Mans…eld et al. (1968) . To the best of our knowledge, the …rst scholars hinting at such shape within a theoretical model are Kamien and Schwartz (1976) . They "address the reported empirical …nding that the rate of innovative activity increases with the intensity of rivalry up to a point, peaks, and declines thereafter with further increase in the competitiveness of the industry" (Kamien and Schwartz, 1976, p. 247 ). However, they do not explicitly model the R&D race as a game, and the prize to the winner is independent of the intensity of rivalry.
2
We borrow from the game-theoretic literature utilized in the '90s and follow Lee and Wilde (1980) . However, we do not blackbox -as they do -the nature of market competition, but we model it explicitly as a homogeneous oligopoly à la Cournot. In such a static two-stage game of R&D, …rms participate in an uncertain race to get a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation which will allow the winner to compete with a cost advantage in the market game. There is no spillover and Cournot competition in the product market allows all (initially identical) …rms to be active also in the asymmetric post-innovation noncooperative equilibrium. For sake of tractability, we adopt a linear-quadratic speci…cation of the R&D technology and the market game of Lee and Wilde (1980) as in Delbono and Denicolò (1991) , where it is shown that, under Cournot competition in the product market, 2 aggregate R&D may respond both ways to increases in market concentration. However, the large number of parameters prevents us from deriving clear-cut analytical conclusions as for the existence of an inverted-U shape relationship. Hence, we resort to numerical simulations and show the emergence of such a shape. Moreover, albeit simple, our model is rich enough to generate also an Arrovian as well as a Schumpeterian behaviour in the relationship between aggregate R&D e¤ort and the numerosity of …rms.
Speci…cally, it turns out that, for a given market size, if the innovation is non-drastic:
1.
A low productivity of the R&D technology (and/or a high level of the discount rate) yields a Schumpeterian relationship, e.g. the equilibrium aggregate R&D e¤ort reaches its peak under monopoly and then monotonically decreases with the number of …rms. This holds irrespective of the size 2 The …rst attempt of modelling the market game as a Cournot one to investigate the relationship between innovation and concentration is Horowitz (1963) ; see also Scherer (1965 Scherer ( , 1967 . Stewart (1983) drops the "winner-takes-all" assumption in the Lee and Wilde's model, but he does not model explicitly the market game.
3 of the innovation.
2.
When the productivity of the R&D technology is high (and/or the level of the discount factor is low), then two scenarios emerge, depending on the magnitude of the cost reduction reached by the winning …rm.
2a. If such a reduction is small w.r.t. the given market size, then we detect an inverted-U shape curve between aggregate R&D and the number of …rms.
2b. If the cost reduction is large -making the innovation almost drastic -then we observe an Arrovian pattern, e.g., the aggregate investment monotonically grows with the number of …rms.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set the background. In section 3 we specialise the general model and summarize the …ndings from a large number of numerical simulations by providing some intuition behind di¤erent patterns. Section 4 concludes.
The background
Consider n identical …rms investing in R&D to be …rst in getting a technological improvement. Firms act noncooperatively and choose an investment expenditure x to maximise the discounted stream of expected pro…ts. Technological uncertainty is of the exponential type, i.e., the discovery time is described by an exponential (or Poisson, or 'memoryless') distribution function. Firm i = 1; 2; :::n then maximises the following payo¤
where r > 0 is the common discount rate, h (x i ) is i's hazard rate (i.e., the instantaneous probability of innovating conditional upon not having inno-
is the discounted continuation value of the game if i wins (loses) the race. This is the formulation of Lee and Wilde (1980) which mod-i…es Loury's (1979) as for the speci…cation of the R&D cost. Here, they are non-contractual, that is, a …xed rate of spending x i until a …rm succeeds.
As for the hazard function, it is assumed that it is strictly concave, h (0) = 0 = lim x i !1 h 0 (x i ) and lim x i !1 h 0 (x i ) = 1: These are the so-called Inada conditions ensuring the existence of an interior solution and the satisfaction of the second order condition.
The speci…cation of the nature of the R&D cost matters as for the comparative statics properties of the model. Indeed, while Loury (1979) proves that, in the Nash equilibrium, the optimal individual R&D e¤ort decreases in the number of …rms, Lee and Wilde (1980) prove the opposite. 3 Slightly later, a parallel debate started on the relationship between market power and the incentive to get an exogenous innovation, with Newbery (1982, 1984) and Reinganum (1983) , reaching opposite conclusions about the persistence of monopoly. This discussion echoes the old dichotomy between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . The subsequent literature focusses on the impact of industry structure or the intensity of competition (e.g., Bertrand vs Cournot) for a given market structure on the aggregate investment in R&D, and is accurately accounted for in Tirole (1988) and Reinganum (1989) , inter alia. On the basis of the original contraposition between Schumpeterian and the Arrovian views, the main concern dealt with 3 In Loury's (1979) formulation, the …rm's maximand is:
where x i is a lump-sum paid by …rm i at the outset. "The intuition behind these conclusions is simple. In the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) To do so, we make a further step by specifying the nature of prizes in the race, following Delbono and Denicolò (1991) who consider …rms striving for a non drastic cost-reducing innovation and Cournot competition in the market game. The expected stream of discounted pro…ts for …rm i becomes:
where W is the instantaneous pro…t accruing forever to the winner of the R&D race, L is the instantaneous pro…t accruing forever to each loser, and C is the instantaneous pro…t in the pre-innovation symmetric Cournot equilibrium. In the symmetric equilibrium, the following condition must hold:
It can be shown (Beath et al., 1989; and Delbono and Denicolò, 1990) that the equilibrium R&D e¤ort is increasing in both W C and W L . Let us label the former as technological incentive and the latter as strategic incentive. Notice that W C is the di¤erence between the pro…t of the winner and the current pro…t. Such a di¤erence captures what has been called the 'pro…t incentive'by Beath et al. (1989) , the 'stand alone incentive'by Katz and Shapiro (1987) and it is related to -but it doesn't coincide withthe 'replacement e¤ect'in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) who follow Arrow's (1962) expression.
6
On the other hand, W L is the di¤erence in pro…ts between winning and losing the race, and it captures what has been named as the 'competitive threat' by Beath et al. (1989) , the 'incentive to pre-empt' by Katz and Shapiro (1987) and the 'e¢ ciency e¤ect' by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1988) . 
which, if @x (n) =@n < 0; may be nil for some n (possibly more than once, as the expression in square brackets will not be linear w.r.t. n, in general). This amounts to saying that @x (n) =@n < 0 is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the arising of inverted U's. This fact could have triggered a deeper investigation of the relationship between aggregate e¤ort and market structure in the vein of the debate between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) , possibly spotting a non-monotone behaviour as in Aghion et al. (2005) . If this idea had emerged at the time, one should have tried to sign the following expression: @ 2 (nx (n)) @n 2 = 2 @x (n) @n + n @ 2 x (n) @n 2
In (5), the sign of @x (n) =@n was established, on the basis of various speci-…cations of the model. 6 Conversely, the sign of @ 2 x (n) =@n 2 has never been discussed, as (5), in itself, was not considered. 4 See Aghion et al. (2015) for an updated account of such a debate. 5 Wherever useful, we follow this literature by treating n as a continuous variable. 6 If the winner takes all, under contractual R&D costs as in Loury (1979) What we are setting out to do in the remainder of the paper is to specify all of the components of (2) as in Delbono and Denicolò (1991) 
As for the hazard function, we stipulate that h (x i ) = 2 p x i ; where is a positive parameter measuring the e¢ ciency of R&D expenditure. In what follows, we consistently use =r to save on notation.
Given the triple of pro…ts in (6) and the above speci…cation of the hazard function, the …rst order condition (FOC) taken on (2) w.r.t. x i ; under symmetry, is
which yields: 
which, considering that > 0; implies
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that lim n!1 + = 1; lim n!1 + = 0; @ + =@n < 0 and @ 2 + =@n 2 > 0. That is, (i) + is decreasing and convex in n; (ii) in monopoly, > 0 surely; and …nally (iii) under perfect competition, < 0 surely.
Since the numerator of the expression on the l.h.s. in (7) is concave in x, the foregoing analysis proves We are now in a position to assess the impact of industry structure on the aggregate R&D e¤ort.
Schumpeter, Arrow, and inverted-U' s
De…ne the aggregate equilibrium investment as X = nx . Despite the use of an extremely simpli…ed speci…cation of the model, X remains highly non linear in n; which prevents the analytical treatment of the problem under scrutiny and calls for numerical simulations. 7 We distinguish two cases, depending on the size of = =r. 8 Hence, what follows lends itself to a twofold interpretation, which can focus either on the productivity of R&D for a given level of impatience, or the opposite. In both scenarios, we set parameter values so that (2) be positive.
Scenario I: + In this case, and r are set so as to identify values of 2 (0; + ] : Hence, by Proposition 1, aggregate e¤ort is
First of all, we evaluate the behaviour of X + w.r.t. n in n = 1: Were the aggregate e¤ort be increasing in n under monopoly, this would exclude a Schumpeterian pattern. To see that this is not the case, note that the following derivative: @X + @n n=1 = 6 (1 + ) + d 2 4d 2 s 2 + d 8s 2 2 + 3 + 2s (8 + 5 )
where q 1 + d (d + 2s) 2 , is clearly negative. Moreover, the limit values of X + are: 7 We have performed simulations using the ManipulatePlot device in Wolfram's Mathematica 10.1. 8 In Delbono and Denicolò (1991) , only one solution is considered because attention is focussed on low values of ; in particular so low that the second-order e¤ects of R&D e¢ ciency (or impatience, as measured by r) can be neglected.
These properties, of course, do not exclude a non-monotone behaviour of industry investment in some range of n greater than one but not arbitrarily large. For this reason we switch to numerical simulations, …xing once and for all s = 1. We have performed simulations using the following parameter constellations: 
focussing on cases where s > d; x + > 0 and i x + 0. The qualitative properties of the pattern emerging from this simulation are depicted in Figure 1 , displaying a Schumpeterian behaviour of aggregate investment w.r.t. industry structure, as X + consistently looks decreasing and convex in n. 9 9 If = + ; the aggregate industry e¤ort is nx + = nx and its expression is
which is decreasing and convex in n for all s > d. Figure 1 The Schumpeterian case The fact that X is monotonically increasing in n when is large and the innovation is almost drastic is intuitively due to the fact that, in such a case, the prize to the winner is very close to the pure monopoly pro…ts associated with the new technology. Notice that a su¢ cient condition to obtain an Arrovian pattern is that both the technological and the strategic incentives are greater for the oligopolist than for the monopolist. Suppose the innovation is drastic (d = s) ; then, the technological incentive is greater for the oligopolist, whereas the strategic 13 incentive is identical across …rms. By continuity, if d is lower than s but close to it, also the strategic incentive is greater for the oligopolist. 10 For instance, keeping s at 1 and taking as a reference set of intervals the following: 
one has to take into account the constraint > + ; which depends on fd; ng. A pair which surely satis…es this constraint is fd = 1=2; = 50g
and this generates the Arrovian graph appearing in Figure 2 , where the curve starts at n = 2 and the optimal monopoly e¤ort x + j n=1 is identi…ed by the ‡at line. x M 10 Incidentally, this is precisely the setting considered by Reinganum (1983) in her reply to Gilbert and Newbery (1982) .
14 The remaining pattern, which is in Figure 3 , re ‡ects the inverted-U shape we know from Aghion et al. (2005) . In our setting, such a curve emerges when the cost reduction is very small as compared to market size. Taking as a general reference (17) , then …xing fd = 1=100; = 50g ;
and accounting for the integer constraint on n, the peak of X is in correspondence of n = 3; with X ' 0:122; while x M ' 0:007. The intuition behind this curve may rely upon the contrast between the small technological gain and the price e¤ect driven by the numerosity of rivals. In a highly concentrated oligopoly, the gain from the R&D investment (which is highly productive) prevails and the curve looks like the Arrovian one. As market competition intensi…es and erodes pro…ts, the opposite applies and the curve slopes downwards as in Schumpeter. 15 
Concluding remarks
The long-standing debate about the impact of industry structure on aggregate innovative activity has been revitalised by Aghion et al. (2005) putting in evidence a concave non-monotone behaviour in sharp contrast with Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) . This has triggered a new stream of research aimed at modelling this inverted-U shape relationship emerging from empirical evidence.
We have participated in this research by revisiting the model in Delbono and Denicolò (1991) , where a hint in this direction was already suggested.
Although the complexity of the model requires resorting to numerical simulation, it is nonetheless true that the conclusions we reach are robust to the speci…cation of parameters and, more importantly, lend themselves to an interpretation in line with the intuition inherited from a well established tradition.
In summary, our …ndings can be spelled out as follows. If innovations are non-drastic, for a given market size: (i) a Schumpeterian pattern is generated by a low productivity of the R&D technology, or, equivalently, high discounting, regardless of the innovation size; (ii) the Arrovian and nonmonotone patterns arise when R&D e¢ ciency is high, or discounting is low.
The former is driven by large innovations, while the latter by small ones.
